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Abstract
We present a method for relevance sensitive non-
monotonic inference from belief sequences which incor-
porates insights pertaining to prioritized inference and
relevance sensitive, inconsistency tolerant belief revi-
sion. Our model uses a finite, logically open sequence
of propositional formulas as a representation for beliefs
and defines a notion of inference from maxiconsistent
subsets of formulas guided by two orderings: a tem-
poral sequencing and an ordering based on relevance
relations between the conclusion and formulas in the
sequence. The relevance relations are ternary (using
context as a parameter) as opposed to standard bi-
nary axiomatizations. The inference operation thus
defined easily handles iterated revision by maintain-
ing a revision history, blocks the derivation of inconsis-
tent answers from a possibly inconsistent sequence and
maintains the distinction between explicit and implicit
beliefs. In doing so, it provides a finitely presented
formalism and a plausible model of reasoning for auto-
mated agents.
Introduction
Belief revision is the process of transforming a belief
state K upon receipt of new information α. There are
two fundamental approaches to this problem. In the
logic-constrained or horizontal approach (Ga¨rdenfors &
Rott 1995), the belief representation is a theory K and
given a new proposition α, (Alchourron, Ga¨rdernfors,
& Makinson 1985) propose postulates forK∗α, the the-
ory revised with α. In this approach the belief state is
itself sophisticated, and constructing the updated be-
lief state requires work. The usual constructions for
AGM revisions using selection functions and epistemic
entrenchments often fail to provide an adequate account
of iterated revision. AGM-like postulates do not spec-
ify how we came to believe K and after revision, it is
assumed that K ∗ α is a generic theory. But these pos-
tulates ignore the fact that α was our last information.
The vertical approach, in contrast, uses trivial (and
repeatable) operations of revision and expansion on fi-
nite, logically open, belief representations, but utilizes
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a sophisticated notion of non-monotonic inference, see,
e.g. (Doyle 1979), (Brewka 1991).
We suggest, in conformance with the vertical ap-
proach, that K ∗ α be taken to be the belief sequence
K;α, i.e., a finite, logically open, sequence of propo-
sitions with α being the most recent. This suggestion
that the most perspicuous way to represent our beliefs
is a finite, logically open, set of sentences, i.e., a be-
lief base has been made (amongst others) by (Hans-
son 1992), (Nebel 1992); the notion that a sequence of
formulas captures the importance of temporal ordering
and of maintaining a revision history is noted by (Ryan
1991) and (Lehmann 1995).
Since updating becomes simple under this approach,
the notion of inference must be correspondingly more
sophisticated. We describe a method for non-monotonic
inference from belief sequences which does this, but
departs significantly from previous approaches in one
respect. It makes heavy use of relevance relations
amongst formulas in a belief base.
This method incorporates the insights in earlier pro-
posals made by (Georgatos 1996), (Parikh 1999) and
(Chopra & Parikh 1999). (Georgatos 1996) uses the
linear order of a belief sequence as a prioritization to
generate a variety of inference relations, shows that
these schemes are non-monotonic and, therefore, induce
a method for belief revision. (Parikh 1999) shows that
if we have a theory referring to two or more disjoint
subjects, then our language can be partitioned into cor-
responding sub-languages, and it is suggested that new
information about one of them should not affect any
other. This ensures a relevance or context sensitive, lo-
calized notion of belief revision and serves as one way of
capturing a more general notion of relatedness amongst
propositions in a belief base (as studied by (Wasserman
1999)). (Chopra & Parikh 1999) consider sets of the-
ories called B-structures, which are individually con-
sistent, but can be jointly inconsistent, to capture the
intuition that real agents often reason with an incon-
sistent, yet usable, set of beliefs which is divided into
individually consistent compartments.
Our (current) method of inference blocks the deriva-
tion of explicitly inconsistent beliefs from a possibly
inconsistent belief sequence by using a notion of infer-
ence from maxiconsistent subsets of relevant formulas.
Choosing maxiconsistent subsequences in order to avoid
inconsistency was used in (Georgatos 1996), while rele-
vance is determined, as in (Parikh 1999) and (Chopra &
Parikh 1999) by a specialized notion of language overlap
or by other context determined features. The formula
whose inference from the sequence is to be determined
imposes a prioritization on the formulas present in the
sequence by virtue of its relevance relations with them
(thus reorganizing the temporal ordering present in the
sequence).
Thus we do not treat a belief sequence as a set but
rather as a linear order much like an entrenchment
((Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson 1988), (Georgatos 1997)) ex-
cept that two orderings, level of relevance and tempo-
ral order govern the sequence. The resulting procedure
for inference serves as a generalization of the methods
presented in (Georgatos 1996) and (Chopra & Parikh
1999). In this way, we hope to present a model for belief
revision that is a plausible representation of real agents’
reasoning.
In the first section of the paper, we present prelimi-
nary definitions and establish the notion of relatedness
that we will work with. In the second section we define
our notion of inference and examine its properties.
Notation: In the following, L is a finite propositional
language with the usual logical connectives (¬,∨,∧,→
,↔). The constants true, false are in L. Greek letters
α, β, γ denote arbitrary formulas while Roman lower
case letters p, q, r denote propositional atoms. α ⇔ β
means that α ↔ β is a tautology. Cn will denote the
usual classical consequence relation. We reserve the
letters σ, τ for belief sequences.
Belief Sequences
We begin with a definition of a belief sequence:
Definition 1 A belief sequence is a sequence of formu-
las under a temporal ordering, i.e., a sequence of formu-
las, σ = β1 . . . βn where for any pair of beliefs βi, βj if
i < j, βj is more recent than βi. Given two sequences,
σ1, σ2 we say that σ1 ⊑ σ2 if σ2 is obtained from σ1 by
the concatenation of zero or more formulas; σ1 will be
referred to as an initial segment of σ2
Under a temporal ordering the most recent formulas oc-
cur at the tail of the sequence. We assume that each
formula α in the sequence is expressed in its smallest
language Lα as defined below. Note that the linear tem-
poral order can be replaced with some other linear order
expressing prioritization. For example, one could order
the propositions on the basis of the trustworthiness of
their source.
We now present a relation of relatedness amongst for-
mulas in a sequence (originally proposed and used in
(Parikh 1999), (Chopra & Parikh 1999) for localized
belief revision) as a preliminary to its modification for
use in this study. First, a distinction between different
languages that a formula can be expressed in:
Definition 2 The language L(α) is the set of propo-
sitional variables which actually occur in a formula α;
the language Lα of α is the smallest set of propositional
variables which can be used to express β, a formula log-
ically equivalent to α.
So, if α = p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ ¬p2) then β is p1 and Lα = {p1}
while L(α) = {p1, p2}. (Lα is unique, cf. Lemma LS1 in
(Parikh 1999)). Lα has logically attractive properties,
e.g. if α ⇔ β, then Lα = Lβ. Hence we shall work
exclusively with this notion.
Definition 3 α, β are related by syntactic language
overlap (Rs(α, β)) if L(α) ∩ L(β) 6= ∅. α, β are related
by logical language overlap (Rl(α, β))if Lα ∩ Lβ 6= ∅.
It is easily seen that Rl(α, β)) implies Rs(α, β)).
In earlier work on relatedness, Epstein (Epstein 1995)
imposes the following ‘plausibility’ requirements on any
relatedness relation R(α, β) (α is related to β):
R1 R(α, β) iff R (¬α, β).
R2 R(α, β ∧ γ) iff R (α, β → γ).
R3 R(α, β) iff R(β, α).
R4 R(α, α).
R5 R (α, β → γ) iff R (α, β) or R(α, γ).
Rodrigues (Rodrigues 1997) has shown that the rela-
tion (Rs(α, β)), i.e., syntactic language overlap, is the
smallest relation satisfying Epstein’s conditions.
However, we might also consider a condition not con-
sidered by Epstein:
R6 if R(α, β) and β ⇔ β′ then R(α, β′).
Observation 1 Rs does not satisfy R6 whereas the re-
latedness relation Rl does satisfy R6 as well as condi-
tions R1, R3-4 (but not the conditions R2, R5).
Since condition R6 is very natural, we wonder if con-
ditions R2, R5 were adopted out of a feeling that they
are compatible with R6. Indeed, in general, though
not always, we do have Lβ∧γ = Lβ→γ = Lβ ∪ Lγ . In
such a case it will be the case that α is relevant to the
composite formula iff it is relevant to at least one part.
Note that our Rl does satisfy half of R5:
R5a: If Rl(α, β → γ) then Rl(α, β) or Rl(α, γ).
For an actual example, notice that if we let β = p, γ =
¬p, then β → γ is equivalent to ¬p and of course rele-
vant to p. However, β∧γ is p∧¬p, a downright contra-
diction and not relevant (in our opinion) to anything.
This fact casts some doubt on the intuition behind R2.
Indeed it turns out that R2,R5 are incompatible with
the natural requirement R6.
With the discussion above as a guide, we now develop
a context-sensitive measure for relevance amongst for-
mulas in a belief sequence.
Definition 4 Two formulas β1, β2 ∈ L are (logically)
disjoint iff Lα ∩ Lβ = ∅.
Definition 5 1. A pair of formulas, α, β are directly
relevant if they are not logically disjoint, i.e., if Lα ∩
Lβ 6= ∅.
2. Given a belief sequence σ, a pair of formulas α, β are
k-relevant wrt σ if ∃χ1, χ2, . . . χk ∈ σ such that:
i) α, χ1 are directly relevant
ii) χi, χi+1 are directly relevant for i = 1, . . . k − 1
iii) χk, β are directly relevant.
We write Rk(α, β, σ) to indicate that α, β are k-
relevant w.r.t σ. If k = 0 above, the formulas are
directly relevant.
3. A pair of formulas are irrelevant if they are not k-
relevant for any k.
4. rel(α, β, σ) is the the lowest k such that α, β are k-
relevant wrt σ (we let it be ∞ if α, β are irrelevant).
In the following observations, we omit the sequence
σ when clear from the context.
Observation 2 1. If a pair of formulas are k-relevant,
then, ∀m > k, they are m-relevant as well.
2. Let [[σ]] = {α | α occurs in σ}. We say that σ1 ⊆
′
σ2
iff [[σ1]] ⊆ [[σ2]]. If σ1 ⊆
′
σ2, then rel(α, β, σ2) ≤
rel(α, β, σ1).
3. The relation Rk(α, β, σ) is both symmetric and re-
flexive in the first two arguments but obviously not
transitive.
4. If k = 0 then the sequence σ is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of k-relevance of formulas α, β; if k 6= 0, then σ
is a parameter in determining relevance between α, β.
Rk(α, β, σ) depends only on Lα, Lβ and [[σ]] and not on
α, β and σ themselves.
So if two formulas are relevant to each other at one level,
then they are relevant at all weaker (higher k) levels.
The definition of relevance above explicitly brings in
(as a third parameter) the sequence σ which can form
a bridge between formulas which do not have a direct
overlap. Normally, relevance has been thought of as a
binary relation; our definition renders it a ternary one.
Thus the sequence σ can play the role of connecting up
formulas which do not have any overlap in language but
are connected through other beliefs. A fact about Taj
Mahal and one about India will be connected because of
our (true) belief that the Taj Mahal is in India. We can
also have more distant - and less convincing - indirect
connections. E.g. we can think of beliefs linking the
subject matter European History, to European Music
and then to Music in general, to Indian Music. But it
is unlikely that we have beliefs directly linking European
History to Indian Music and this level (k = 2) may be
too weak (too high) to be useful in most considerations.
The above definition extends the definition of rele-
vance proposed in (Parikh 1999) and makes explicit the
contextual nature of the relevance definition: two formu-
las α, β may have different degrees of relevance to each
other in virtue of different belief sequences. A belief
sequence defines a particular context for subject mat-
ters; pairs of formulas acquire different relationships to
one another given differing contexts. The more basic
beliefs (i.e., elements of σ) that a person has, the more
likely (s)he is to connect two apparently unconnected
subjects.
Revision and Inference on Belief
Sequences
Revision on belief sequences is easily achieved: we sim-
ply concatenate the new formula γ to the sequence.
The sequence β1, . . . , βn becomes β1 . . . βn, βn+1 where
βn+1 = γ.
Definition 6 σ ∗ γ = σ; γ where σ; γ represents the
concatenation of γ to a belief sequence σ.
Note that [[σ ∗ γ]] = [[σ]] ∪ {γ}.
Example: Consider the sequence σ = [p, q, p ∧ q,¬r].
If we receive the information β = ¬p, it is simply ap-
pended to the sequence to give us σ ∗ β = [p, q, p ∧
q,¬r,¬p]. [[σ]] is now inconsistent, and we need a notion
of inference which renders the agent’s beliefs coherent.
Prioritized Inference
Suppose that we have a sequence of formulas which is
our current belief base and we are asked about some
formula γ, whether we believe it or not. As we saw just
above, the set [[σ]] may well be inconsistent, and hence
to decide about the status of γ we will need to pick some
consistent subset of [[σ]] which we bring into play. The
choice of formulas to be in such a subset will be gov-
erned by two considerations. One is temporality (which
we provisionally adopt) under which more recently re-
ceived formulas have priority over older formulas. The
other is relevance according to which more relevant for-
mulas have priority. Clearly we need to decide which
order counts more. We have made the decision in this
paper that relevance is more important than temporal-
ity but that between two formulas of equal relevance,
the more recent formula has priority, We concede how-
ever, that the other procedure, to count temporality
more, also has something to say in its favor. Ordinary
human reasoning, in our opinion is a pragmatic blend
of the two techniques.
We use the maxiconsistent approach to define prior-
itized inference on a belief sequence σ. This method
employs a consistent subset of [[σ]] obtained as follows.
Consider a formula γ in its smallest language Lγ . We
construct a maxiconsistent subset Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 (of k-relevant
to γ formulas) of [[σ]]. The construction of this set is
regulated by the ordering ≺ that γ creates on σ, which
arranges β1, . . . , βn into δ1, . . . , δn as follows:
Definition 7 Given a formula γ, a sequence σ, β, β′ ∈
σ, β ≺ β′ if either
a) rel(γ, β, σ) < rel(γ, β′, σ) (i.e., β is more relevant
to γ than β′)
or b) β, β′ are equally relevant (i.e., rel(γ, β, σ) =
rel(γ, β′, σ)) but β is more recently received than β′
The δ1, . . . , δn are the β1, . . . , βn under this order. In
the definition below Γ is (short for) the set Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 re-
ferred to above. k is some preselected level of relevance.
Definition 8 Γ0 = ∅,
Γi+1 =
{
Γi if Γi ⊢ ¬δi+1 or if ¬Rk(δi+1, γ, σ)
Γi ∪ {δi+1} otherwise
Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 = Γ
n.
We check formulas for addition to Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 in order of
their decreasing relevance to γ. The lower the level of
relevance allowed (i.e., the higher the value of k), the
larger the part of σ considered. We now define the
inference operation ⊢k.
Definition 9 σ ⊢k γ iff Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 ⊢ γ
Once Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 has been constructed, the inference oper-
ation defined above enables a query answering scheme
for the agent with definite responses:
If Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 ⊢ γ, then answer ‘yes’.
If Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 ⊢ ¬γ then answer ‘no’.
Otherwise, answer ‘no information’.
Even if [[σ]] is inconsistent, the agent is able to give
consistent answers to every individual query.
Discussion The notion of inference thus defined has
some desirable features. As an example, suppose our
belief sequence is initiated by first being told p and
then ¬p∧¬q. ¬p∧¬q overrides p and we will no longer
answer ‘yes’ to p. However, if we are now told p∨q, this
new information overrides ¬p∧¬q. Thus, our maxicon-
sistent set Γ<σ,0,p> is {p ∨ q, p} and the query p? will
now be answered in the affirmative. This is plausible
since the latest information decreases the reliability of
¬p∧ ¬q and the original information p regains its orig-
inal standing. Such accomodations are not easily made
within traditional, AGM-based frameworks for belief re-
vision.
The maxiconsistent set Γ<σ,k,p> obtained depends on
whether some new information came “in several pieces”
or as a single formula. Receiving two pieces of informa-
tion individually and together often has very different
effects on an agent’s epistemic state. If we receive α
and β seperately, then a later information which un-
dermines α need not undermine β as well. But if we
received the conjunction α ∧ β then undermining one
will undermine both. As an example, consider the ar-
guments against the AGM Axioms 7,8 in (Parikh 1999)
where it is argued that revision by conjunctions is not
the same as revising by conjuncts individually.
Example: Suppose our current beliefs are ¬p,¬q
and we receive the information that p ∨ q. If p is much
more believable than q we might now decide that p
holds. Suppose we next hear that ¬p ∨ q. Since this
is consistent with our current state, we accept it, end-
ing with a state generated by p, q. However, if we had
received the conjunction (p ∨ q) ∧ (¬p ∨ q), this would
be equivalent to receiving just q and we would never
have believed p at all. Note that this is also a situa-
tion where we found Epstein’s postulate R2 to be im-
plausible, for the language L(p∨q)∧(¬p∨q) does not equal
L(p∨q) ∪ L(¬p∨q) in this case.
For a concrete example let p be “The stove is smok-
ing” and q be “The house is on fire”. If I am told that
either the stove is smoking or that the house is on fire,
I will choose to believe that the stove is smoking. If I
later find that either the stove is not smoking or the
house is on fire, since this belief is consistent, I must
now add it, and conclude that the stove is smoking and
the house is on fire! But if I had been told the con-
junction, which is equivalent to “The house is on fire”,
I would never have thought about the stove at all.
As a final point, consider the sequence σ2 = [p ∧
q, r ∧ ¬q]. Both p and r are derivable although their
respective derivation is based on incompatible informa-
tion. This is due to the fact that the formulas which
are preferred in each case depend on the query. This is
plausible however; agents often think about unrelated
pieces of information in isolation from each other. Here
p and r are not directly related and therefore may be
thought about by the agent separately.
Prioritization of Directly relevant formulas
Further depth could be introduced into the method pro-
vided above by introducing a prioritization amongst for-
mulas based on the amount by which formulas β of σ
overlap with the query formula γ. Thus such a prior-
itization γ might be defined as follows: let β1 γ β2
if |Lβ1 ∩ Lγ | > |Lβ2 ∩ Lγ |. Under this prioritization
scheme, we would use the size of overlap of languages
as a measure.
Such a measure however, is open to objections that
propositions that share fewer symbols might actually
be more relevant than those that share more symbols
depending upon the symbols shared. As an example,
consider our intuition that if two formulas both mention
aardvarks, they are (most likely) more relevant to each
other than if they mentioned cats. Or, the fact that the
authors of this paper are logicians is a closer relatedness
relation than the fact that they are all human beings.
The ordering β1 γ β2 can be further refined then, by
the following heuristic: if symbols shared by formulas
occur frequently in σ, then there is a smaller likelihood
that the formulas are relevant to each other whereas if
they share symbols that occur with less frequency in the
sequence σ. then the relvance is greater. This provides
for a notion of degree of relevance amongst directly (and
only for directly) relevant formulas. However, a fuller
discussion would take us too far afield and we postpone
such refinements to a more extended treatment.
Answer sets and Consequence relations We now
define an attendant notion of a consequence relation
Ck(σ) at a given level of relevance, k:
Definition 10 Ck(σ) = {γ|σ ⊢k γ}
Definition 11 C(σ) = {γ|∃k, σ ⊢k γ} =
⋃
Ck(σ)
In view of the following propositions, if we were not
worried about computational costs then C(σ) would be
the only notion which would interest us as Ck(σ) ⊆
Ck+1(σ) and so we would only stop at a smaller k to
conserve resources.
Proposition 1 The inference procedure defined above
is monotonic in k, the degree of relevance, i.e., σ ⊢k
γ ⇒ σ ⊢k+1 γ.
The above follows immediately from the fact that if
k < k′ then Γ<σ,k,p> ⊆ Γ<σ,k′,p> It will also be useful
to remember that if two formulas α, β have the same
language, Lα = Lβ , then Γ<σ,k,α> = Γ<σ,k,β>.
Remark: The inference procedure is of course non-
monotonic in expansions of a belief sequence, i.e., if
σ ⊑ σ
′
and σ ⊢k γ, it is not necessarily the case that
σ
′
⊢k γ. For example p is derivable from the sequence
p, but not from, say p;¬(p ∨ q). But if we revise by
formulas that are ‘irrelevant’ to the query γ in question
then they will have no effect on the derivation of γ and
γ will still be derived from the longer sequence.
Even though our technique might give disparate an-
swers to formulas α and β which have different lan-
guages, the answer set for any fixed set of subject mat-
ters will have quite nice properties.
Observation 3 If Σ is a set of propositional atoms,
then {α|Lα = Σ} ∩ Ck(σ) 6⊢⊥.
The agent’s responses to a particular subject matter
are guaranteed to be consistent by the query answering
scheme.
Remark: Our inference method corresponds to the lib-
eral inference defined on a linearly prioritized sequence
of formulas in (Georgatos 1996). (Georgatos 1996) de-
fines a strict notion of inference as well, which in our
case would correspond to stopping the construction of
Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 upon encountering the first formula that would
make the set inconsistent.
Properties of ⊢k
Proposition 2 The following properties hold for the
process of revision defined on sequences.
• Weak Inclusion: If γ 6=⊥ then σ ∗ γ ⊢k γ
The following additional properties hold under the con-
dition that Lα = Lβ:
• Weak (or Cautious) Monotonicity:
σ ⊢k α, σ ⊢k β
σ ∗ α ⊢k β
• Rational Monotonicity:
σ 6⊢k ¬α, σ ⊢k β
σ ∗ α ⊢k β
• Weak Cut:
σ ∗ α ⊢k β, σ ⊢k α
σ ⊢k β
• Adjunction:
σ ⊢k α, σ ⊢k β
σ ⊢k α ∧ β
• Right Weakening:
σ ⊢k α, α ⊢ β
σ ⊢k β
The condition Lα = Lβ is important for the following
reason. As we have remarked, [[σ]] may be, and usually
is, inconsistent. To get consistent answers to a query γ
we restrict ourselves to a certain portion of [[σ]] and this
portion will depend on the language Lγ . It is natural
then that different γ, γ′ with different languages will
evoke different subsets of [[σ]]. We cannot then require
that these subsets will always produce coherent answers
which obey our rules. However, in practice there will
be some coherence.
For just one example that Weak Monotonicity can fail
in general unless Lα = Lβ: let σ = [p,¬p ∧ ¬q, q].
Now, ∀k, σ ⊢k p ∧ q, but also, σ ⊢k ¬p. But clearly,
σ ∗ (p ∧ q) 6⊢k ¬p. Similar examples can be constructed
for the other rules mentioned above. From a practical
point of view, if two queries α, β are asked on the same
occasion, a smarter query answering procedure should
use L = Lα∪Lβ as the language for determining direct
relevance. The answers thus generated will be compat-
ible with each other.
New formulas can block the derivation of formulas
which were derivable before and so they provide a sim-
ple modeling for loss of belief in a proposition. After
all, agents do not lose beliefs without a reason: to drop
the belief that α is to revise by some information that
changes our reasoning. Still, it is possible in our model
to lose α without acquiring ¬α. For example, consider
the sequences σ = p ∧ q and σ ∗ (¬p ∨ ¬q). The revised
sequence no longer answers ‘yes‘ to p but neither does it
answer ‘yes‘ to ¬p. (¬p∨¬q) has undermined σ = p∧ q
without actually making ¬p derivable.
Equivalence Given the notion of inference defined
above, we say that belief sequences which yield the same
answers to all queries are equivalent. But equivalence
is not always preserved under extensions. Consider the
following example: σ1 = [¬p ∧ ¬q], σ2 = [p,¬p ∧ ¬q].
σ1, σ2 are equivalent, but neither σ1 nor σ2 implies p
as a conclusion. However, revising by the formula p∨ q
yields p as a conclusion for σ2 though not for σ1. Given
this observation, we would like to define a strong notion
of equivalence which is unaffected by revision.
Definition 12 • Sequences σ1, σ2 are equivalent if
C(σ1) = C(σ2).
• Sequences σ1, σ2 are strongly equivalent if C(σ1 ∗α1 ∗
. . . αn) = C(σ1 ∗ α1 ∗ . . . αn) for all sequences of re-
visions α1, . . . , αn.
• σ1 subsumes σ2 if C(σ2) ⊆ C(σ1).
We suspect that the notion of strong equivalence is
testable via a single revision, i.e., if σ and σ′ are not
strongly equivalent, then there is a γ such that σ ∗ γ
and σ′ ∗ γ are not equivalent.
An obvious, related, question is, how can all se-
quences be trimmed or reduced to their shortest equiv-
alent form? The task of reducing sequences to their
simplest equivalent form is most likely, computation-
ally non-trivial.
Complexity of the Inference Procedure In the
methods defined above, there are two sources of com-
plexity. For any query γ the first one involves the cal-
culation of the smallest language Lγ , which is a co-NP
complete problem (Herzig & Rifi 1999), but only in the
(relatively short) length of the individual formula γ and
not in the size of the entire belief base σ. The second
one involves checking the consistency of the set Γi at
each step of the construction of the set Γ of the maxi-
consistent set related to the query formula γ. However,
for normal bases σ it is likely to be the case that sym-
bols which occur in formulas which are k-relevant to
γ are few in number. In other words, there is a small
language L′ with |L′| ≪ |L| such that for any formula
α ∈ σ, with α k-relevant to γ, Lα ⊆ L
′. The consis-
tency check then will be quite feasible.
Our answering method first calculates the relevance
relation exhaustively for the entire sequence. Then the
set Γ is constructed formula by formula. Since each
stage of the construction involves a consistency check,
the complexity of the procedure is polynomial with an
NP oracle, but only in |L′| which will be small if we
keep k small. Moreover, in checking for k-derivability,
the costs would be reduced sharply as most formulas
in the sequence would not be k-relevant and the size
of Γ(σ,k,γ) could be quite small. This is indeed how
we reason in practice. While the logical problem of
deriving consequences from our (possibly inconsistent)
beliefs is daunting, the notion of relevance cuts down
sharply on the effort involved.
Comparison with B-structures In (Chopra &
Parikh 1999) a method for answering queries from B-
structures is presented that allowed the answer ⊤, i.e.,
(over-defined or inconsistent). In our method of infer-
ence, we ensure that Γ〈σ,k,γ〉 is always consistent, thus
preventing an inconsistent answer. The procedure of
(Chopra & Parikh 1999) will (after suitable interpre-
tation) agree with our method when the former gave
’yes’ or ’no’ answers. The B-structure query answering
method corresponds to ⊢0, i.e., to Γ<σ,0,γ> constructed
only with directly relevant formulas.
Conformance with AGM axioms It is natural to
ask how our inference conforms to AGM-like postulates.
We cannot apply the results in (Georgatos 1996) that
show that maxiconsistent inference on a belief sequence
is rational; our inference procedure takes into account
relevance relations that cause a reordering of our se-
quence, depending on the formula whose inference we
are testing. However, some AGM-like properties do
hold.
(σ∗ 1) σ ∗ γ is a belief sequence
(σ∗ 2) γ ∈ Ck(σ ∗ γ) provided that γ is consistent.
(σ∗ 3) If γ ⇔ β then ∀γ, σ, σ ∗ γ ⊢k γ iff σ ∗ β ⊢k γ.
Note too, that there is no counterpart to the AGM ex-
pansion operation
.
+ in our model; revision just is con-
catenation and the content of the new epistemic state
upon revision is given by the inference operation defined
above.
Conformance with Lehmann Axioms A compar-
ison with the Lehmann axioms shows that our method
of inference defined above does not conform to them.
The only one that the method conforms to is I2 which
says that α ∈ [σ ◦ α]. The reason is that in addition to
the temporal ordering of the belief set, we have also im-
posed a relevance ordering. The combination of these
two orderings ensures that formulas whose inference was
possible at one stage of the inference procedure could
be blocked at later stages in the history of the agent not
just by newer information but also by the ancillary phe-
nomenon of more relevant beliefs moving to the front
of the reorganized sequence. Thus if we acquire a new
belief which links p, q, then a query about p will regard
formulas involving q as 1-relevant. For example, after
China invades Tibet (and we find out about it) beliefs
about China may move to the front of the relevance or-
dering, even in a query which is originally only about
Tibet. We believe ours is the first method of updating
and revision which takes such phenomena into account.
Granted that some rather elegant properties of other
formalisms are lost in our method, or, rather, hold only
under conditions like Lα = Lβ. However, this is a nec-
essary consequence of the fact that we are handling
sophisticated and delicate mechanisms used by actual
agents to balance the need for coherenece with the lim-
its on resources.
Conclusion
The method of inference (and belief revision) described
is easily implemented via a finite representation of the
sequence. A full revision history is maintained and it-
erated revision is routine. Explicit attention is paid to
temporal ordering and relevance relations. Our method
extends intuitions found in the work on belief bases, se-
quences and inference relations based on prioritizations
of beliefs and goes beyond by making clear the impor-
tance of a plausible notion of relevance to guide infer-
ence. The method presented is (for small k) resource
conscious; in future work, we plan to implement this
method and further investigate its properties.
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